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In August 1995 the South Centre was established as a permanent inter-
governmental organization of developing countries. In pursuing its 
objectives of promoting South solidarity, South-South cooperation, and 
coordinated participation by developing countries in international forums, 
the South Centre has full intellectual independence. It prepares, publishes 
and distributes information, strategic analyses and recommendations on 
international economic, social and political matters of concern to the South. 
 
The South Centre enjoys support and cooperation from the governments of 
the countries of the South and is in regular working contact with the Non-
Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The Centre’s studies and position 
papers are prepared by drawing on the technical and intellectual capacities 
existing within South governments and institutions and among individuals 
of the South. Through working group sessions and wide consultations, 
which involve experts from different parts of the South, and sometimes 
from the North, common problems of the South are studied and experience 
and knowledge are shared. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
On its website, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines its main purpose 
as the provision of “the global public good of financial stability”.  As spelled out in its 
Articles of Agreement, this requires a stable system of exchange rates, sustainable current 
account balances and orderly currency and balance-of-payments adjustments.  To achieve 
this, Fund undertakes economic and financial surveillance at the national and global 
levels, provides policy advice to its members, and lends to those facing external payment 
difficulties in order to facilitate adjustment.   
The record of the IMF in delivering this global public good leaves much to be 
desired.  The period since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangements has seen 
repeated gyrations in the exchange rates of major currencies, persistent and growing trade 
imbalances, recurrent balance-of-payments, debt and financial crises, many of which 
have reverberated across the global economy. The IMF has been unable to cope with 
misguided macroeconomic, exchange rate and financial policies in countries with a 
disproportionately large influence on global monetary and financial conditions as well as 
autonomous destabilizing impulses generated by financial markets and international 
capital flows unleashed by rapid and widespread liberalization.   
One reason for this poor performance is that the Fund has no teeth vis-à-vis its 
non-borrowing members.  It has little leverage not only over policies in reserve-issuing 
countries, but also in others enjoying surges in capital flows, including developing and 
emerging economies (DEEs), since these countries rarely need the Fund during these 
boom times when the seeds of instability are sown. While the Fund exercises firm 
direction and surveillance over the policies of those members borrowing from it, 
obligations are superfluous and non-binding for non-borrowing members and the Fund 
has no power of enforcement.  For non-borrowing countries, the IMF is a “voluntary 
institution.”
1 
But, more importantly, the IMF has generally been unable to identify build-up of 
financial fragilities, predict instability and crises and issue early warnings in large part 
because of its blind faith in markets.  In the sub-prime turmoil it has missed the biggest 
crisis of its lifetime.  It has persistently failed to warn DEEs against destabilizing capital 
flows, unsustainable exchange rates, payments and debt positions.  Since the mid-1990s 
several countries working under IMF programs and drawing on its resources experienced 
severe instability and crises and in some important cases, such as Russia and Argentina, 
sovereign default could not be avoided.  The IMF’s debt sustainability analyses and 
recommendations have left many poor countries in disarray when they fell back into debt 
distress after being told that their external debt had reached a sustainable position and 
they no longer needed debt relief from official creditors.     
                                                 
1  As remarked by the IMF representative during a UN Working Group Panel on 26 May 2010 on the 
reform of the financial architecture. Research Papers  6 
The more the IMF has failed to prevent instability and crises, the more it has 
become involved in crisis management and lending.  Indeed, with the increased 
frequency of systemic financial shocks, crisis intervention and lending has become the 
primary activity of the Fund so much so that at times of calm when drawing on the IMF 
ceased, as was the case during the great global bubble of 2003-08, its own financial 
viability came in to question.  After every major financial crisis the IMF has sought a 
new role and this has almost always been construed in terms of expansion of its 
emergency lending instruments and capacity.  The current crisis is no exception – it has 
given rise to new facilities for crisis lending and the tripling of IMF resources.   
 
IMF emergency lending is said to play two main roles.  On the one hand, it 
provides breathing space to countries facing severe liquidity problems and payments 
crises, allowing them more time to adjust and helping restore confidence.  On the other 
hand, for countries with “strong and sound policies and fundamentals”, rapid access to 
adequate and upfront financing is expected to play a preventive role, particularly under 
threats of spillovers and contagion from financial instability originating elsewhere in the 
global system.  Moreover, quasi-automatic access to adequate IMF financing is expected 
to diminish the need for self insurance in international reserves and the associated costs 
and trade imbalances.   
 
However, Fund lending has rarely prevented economic downturn in countries 
facing payments instability and crises.  Such lending is often associated with pro-cyclical 
policy conditionality which serves to deepen the impact of the financial crises on jobs and 
income.  This is still the case with the IMF programs in Europe despite the flexibility 
claimed.  But more importantly, emergency lending could create more problems than it 
solves.  When the scale is large, it can endanger the financial integrity of the IMF.   It is 
not always easy to determine if a crisis is one of liquidity rather than insolvency.   
Argentina and Russia ended up in default while receiving IMF support on grounds that 
they were facing liquidity crises, and there is no guarantee that Greece will now be able 
to avoid default.  Since the IMF does not enjoy de jure preferred creditor status, when the 
scale of operations is large, it can get badly hurt in the event of a messy default and asset 
grab race by creditors.  
 
Since the IMF crisis lending is effectively designed to keep countries current on 
debt payments to international creditors and to maintain an open capital account, it often 
leads to an unequal burden-sharing between creditors and debtors.  Commercial debt gets 
replaced by debt to the IMF which is often more difficult to renegotiate.   Private debt 
gets dumped on the public sector – sovereign debt invariably rises after financial crises 
resulting from excessive build up of debt by the private sector.  All these create moral 
hazard and prevent the operation of market discipline, because they allow investors and 
creditors to escape without bearing the full consequences of the risks they have assumed.     
 
Because of the problems posed by bailout operations, the primary task of the Fund 
should be crisis prevention rather than crisis lending.  This calls for a significant 
improvement in the quality of the Fund’s financial and economic surveillance.  It also 
calls for a reform of its members’ obligations so as to bring about a reasonable degree of Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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multilateral discipline over macroeconomic, exchange rate and financial policies, 
particularly in its major members.  The rationale for multilateral discipline is much 
stronger in money and finance than in any other area of global economic 
interdependence, including trade, since adverse external spillovers from monetary and 
financial policies in systemically important countries tend to be much more damaging.   
 
But even with radical reforms in these areas, financial crises with global 
ramifications will continue to occur.  Emergency lending is not, however, the only and 
even the best way of dealing with them.  Orderly debt work-out procedures based on 
widely recognized principles of insolvency designed to secure the involvement of private 
lenders and investors in crisis resolution are more equitable both between debtors and 
creditors and between private and official lenders, and more effective from the point of 
view of their impact on the behaviour of lenders and investors and, hence, on financial 
stability.  It is quite astounding that the international community has been unwilling to 
put in place such mechanisms despite rapidly growing international debtor-creditor 
relationships, still continuing to address sovereign debt crises in an ad hoc manner.  
 
This paper takes up these issues in the reform of the IMF and the international 
monetary system.  Although some specific proposals are discussed, the objective is not to 
provide blueprints, but to draw attention to main shortcomings of international monetary 
and financial arrangements in delivering “the global public good of financial stability.”  
The paper starts with a brief examination of the record of the IMF in early warning and 
crisis prevention and makes an assessment of whether its recent attempts for soul 
searching in financial market analysis and policy advice constitute a break from market 
fundamentalism and the so-called Washington Consensus. 
 
This is followed by a discussion of the main difficulties encountered in securing 
effective and even-handed surveillance and multilateral discipline over macroeconomic, 
exchange rates and financial policies of IMF members and possible modifications to 
existing modalities and obligations.  Possible benefits of independent surveillance are 
assessed and the scope for binding obligations regarding exchange rates and balance-of -
payments adjustment are examined.  It is argued that not only should IMF members 
retain the right to exercise control over capital flows, but the Fund should encourage 
them to do so when and as needed, through its lending programs and Article IV 
consultations.      
 
Section IV looks at the problems resulting from the international reserves system 
based on the dollar and discusses possible alternatives, notably the role that could be 
played by the Specials Drawing Rights (SDRs).  It is argued that a move away from the 
dollar-based reserves system towards SDRs could help reduce global imbalances and 
improve international monetary stability by providing a certain degree of policy 
discipline on the US.  It would also help DEEs, inter alia, by reducing the need for self 
insurance and the associated costs.    
 
Section V follows with a discussion of crisis intervention by the IMF, its 
objectives and impact on financial stability.  It is argued that if instability and crises Research Papers  8 
cannot be prevented, it would be better to respond to them by combining mandatory 
mechanisms to involve private creditors and investors in crisis resolution with emergency 
lending designed to maintain a high level of income and employment than by large scale 
lending to bail them out.  This is one of the most important ingredients of the reforms 
needed to strengthen the capacity of the IMF in crisis prevention.  Otherwise, the IMF 
may increasingly become a quasi-international lender-of-last-resort without the requisite 
capacity and power of oversight and this will likely do more harm than good.   
 
The paper concludes that the international monetary system  needs to be 
restructured with the primary objective of preventing instability and crises, including 
through greater involvement of private lenders and investors in crisis resolution.  A 
genuine reform along these lines will require considerable reflection and debate in the 
international community.  It also presupposes recognition of the problems.  However, 
some of the most important issues such as enforceable exchange rate and adjustment 
obligations, the international reserves system and orderly sovereign debt workout 
mechanisms are not squarely on the agenda of the G20 and the IMF.  Developing 
countries have a particular stake in this endeavour given their vulnerability to shocks and 
limited capacity to respond.  If major countries do not support establishment of an orderly 
and equitable international monetary and financial system, DEEs should find ways and 
means of protecting themselves and looking after their interests through regional 




II  IMF’S FAILURES IN FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND EARLY WARNING 
 
  A key task of the Fund in securing stability is to keep track of economic and 
financial developments at the national, regional and global levels in order to identify the 
build up of potentially damaging macroeconomic imbalances such as excess savings or 
investment, chronic fiscal and balance-of-payments disequilibria or strong inflationary or 
deflationary pressures, and financial fragilities including excessive liquidity creation and 
credit expansion, debt accumulation and asset bubbles, and provide early warning and 
policy advice to governments for corrective action.  In this endeavour the Fund naturally 
relies on a theoretical framework for identifying macroeconomic and financial 
imbalances, their interactions, proximate causes and possible consequences and the 
policies needed to address them.     
 
This is an inherently difficult undertaking given the state of art of 
macroeconomics (White 2009).  Predicting the timing of a crisis is an almost impossible 
task.   There are also serious difficulties in correctly identifying whether asset price 
increases or credit expansions represent a speculative bubble rather than improved 
fundamentals or if a surge in capital flows is sustainable.  However, as noted by two BIS 
economists, “identifying in a timely way the developments of financial imbalances with 
potential unwelcome implications for output and inflation, while very hard, is not 
impossible” (Borio and Lowe 2004: 18).   
 
The failure of the IMF in identifying potentially damaging imbalances and issuing 
early warnings has its origin not so much in the inherent shortcomings of economic 
theory or imperfect knowledge and information as its faith in free markets.  The Fund has 
traditionally adopted a crude neoclassical-cum-monetarist framework premised on 
efficient markets and rational expectations almost to the total neglect of accumulated 
knowledge and insight provided by alternative thinking, believing that disequilibria and 
imbalances generated by freely functioning markets are self correcting without entailing 
severe social and economic costs.  Despite mounting evidence from crises in emerging 
and mature markets alike, the Fund has maintained an obsession with budget deficits and 
inflation, ignoring that asset price inflation driven by speculative lending and investment 
could pose even greater threats to stability and growth. 
 
After recurrent crises in DEEs during the 1990s, the Fund intensified the 
surveillance of financial markets and capital flows, but this has not been effective in 
preventing further crises, including in countries working under IMF programs such as 
Russia, Argentina and Turkey, in large part because of its failure to diagnose and act on 
the root causes of the problem.  The Fund has generally been highly optimistic about the 
sustainability of capital inflows to emerging market economies.  While it should have 
been obvious that preventing unsustainable surges in  capital inflows, rapid deterioration 
of net external asset positions, sharp currency appreciations and mounting trade deficits 
was essential for avoiding future problems, the Fund remained averse to any form of 
control over such flows, including market-friendly measures such as unremunerated Research Papers  10 
reserve requirements recommending, instead, monetary and fiscal tightening and greater 
exchange rate flexibility, which, in the view of its Independent Evaluation Office,  proved 
to be highly ineffective (IMF/IEO 2005: 60).    
 
The Fund has also been lukewarm against interventions in foreign exchange 
markets that many DEEs have used during the surge in capital inflows after 2003 in order 
to avoid currency appreciations and current account deficits, arguing that they were 
ineffective (see, e.g., IMF WEO October 2007: 122-24).  It has favoured, instead, fiscal 
contraction as a remedy despite growing evidence from the BIS and elsewhere that 
currency market interventions have generally been quite successful in emerging 
economies, particularly where the banking sector is closely scrutinized (Akyüz 2009).  Its 
insistence on the ineffectiveness of interventions in conditions of sustained capital 
inflows is particularly inconsistent with its pronouncement that the Chinese RMB is 
undervalued – a country which has been heavily and successfully intervening in order to 
sterilize the impact of its growing current account surpluses and net private capital 
inflows on the RMB/dollar rate.
2  
 
The IMF’s debt sustainability assessments have been as equally problematic as its 
external sustainability analyses.  For emerging economies they often yield highly 
optimistic debt projections while its sensitivity tests have been ineffective in providing 
early warning signals (Akyüz 2007).  These are not simply harmless academic exercises 
for prediction.  The errors in debt sustainability analyses are often carried over both to the 
policy advice that the IMF provides in the context of Article IV consultations or 
conditionalities, and to official debt relief initiatives, thereby affecting the outcome.  
 
Much the same holds for the analyses of debt of Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
where sustainability is relatively easier to assess because the terms and conditions of their 
official debt do not vary much with market conditions.  Several poor countries have seen 
their debt ratios rise significantly above the IMF-determined sustainability thresholds 
after reaching completion points and receiving debt relief at the rate deemed necessary to 
make their debt sustainable (Kitabire and Kabanda 2007).    
    
In the subprime debacle the Fund missed the biggest crisis of its lifetime.  In the 
run up to the crisis it failed to identify the nature and extent of a potentially destabilizing 
speculative build-up and to provide adequate early warning.  According to the Fund 
report on 2006 Article IV Consultations with the United States: “Mortgage securitization 
had helped channel foreign savings into the U.S. housing market while allowing 
mortgage originators greater flexibility to diversify credit exposure and reduce systemic 
risk.”  (IMF 2006: 7-8; italics added).   The Fund staff was preoccupied with reducing 
fiscal and external deficits and maintaining control over inflation as the main policy 
challenges facing the United States economy, while reassuring that the “U.S. financial 
sector has proven exceptionally resilient in recent years.” IMF (2005: p. 31; and 2006: p. 
23).  Even a month before the beginning of the credit crunch, they argued that “the most 
                                                 
2  For the most recent pronouncement of undervaluation of the RMB, see IMF (2010f). Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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likely scenario is a soft landing as growth recovers and inflation falls, although both are 
subject to risks” (IMF 2007: p. 26).   
 
  Even as the depth and the extent of the problem became increasingly obvious to 
many independent observers, the Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report downplayed 
the difficulties faced:  “The weakness has been contained in certain portions of the 
subprime market … and is not likely to pose a serious systemic threat.   Stress tests 
conducted by investment banks show that, even under scenarios of nationwide house 
price declines that are historically unprecedented, most investors with exposure to 
subprime mortgages through securitized structures will not face losses” (IMF GFSR 
April 2007: 7).  This misjudgement of prevailing conditions in financial markets 
continued throughout the year even as banks started reporting large losses:  “Although 
the dislocations, especially to short-term funding markets, have been large and in some 
cases unexpected … systemically important financial institutions began this episode with 
more than adequate capital to absorb the likely level of credit losses.” (IMF GFSR 
October 2007: 10). 
3 
 
  More recently there has been some soul searching at the Fund, in an attempt to 
understand why it failed to warn of the most severe post-war financial turmoil.  It issued 
two papers in 2009 focussing on the initial lessons of the crisis (IMF 2009b and 2009c), 
followed by two authored working papers “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy” 
(Blanchard et al. 2010) and “Capital Inflows:  The Role of Controls” (Ostry et al. 2010), 
discussing the IMF’s positions on macroeconomic, foreign exchange and financial 
policies.   
 
The IMF now recognizes that “surveillance of global economic developments and 
policies did not give sufficiently pointed warnings about the risks building up in the 
international financial system.  …  Fund surveillance echoed the conventional view that 
advanced countries with relatively low and stable inflation together with highly profitable 
and well capitalized banking sectors could withstand the unwinding of any froth in 
housing and capital markets.” While some other institutions and independent 
commentators were strongly warning of downside risks from mid-2000s, by the time the 
“Fund defied conventional wisdom by offering a prescient warning … it was too late” 
(IMF 2009c: 2, 5).  Systemic risks were underestimated because of its focus on inflation 
targeting to the neglect of asset bubbles, the assumption that the possible adverse effects 
of a reversal of asset bubbles on the real economy could be counteracted by lower interest 
rates, and the failure to adequately account for financial sector feedbacks and spillovers 
(IMF 2009b).  Thus, the Fund now advises central banks to abandon the single target 
(inflation) – single tool (the policy rate) approach to monetary policy, to tolerate higher 
rates of inflation and to adopt a broader macro-prudential view, taking into account asset 
price movements, credit booms, leverage and the build up of systemic risks (IMF 2009b 
and Blanchard et al. 2010).  
   
                                                 
3   For a discussion of the IMF’s failure to correctly identify the nature of financial imbalances leading to 
the subprime crisis and its inadequate appreciation of contagion, see Rakshit (2009). Research Papers  12 
  On capital control too the IMF appears to be breaking away from the orthodox 
single-minded opposition to restrictions, arguing that for “both macroeconomic and 
prudential reasons … there may be circumstances in which capital controls are a 
legitimate component of the policy response to surges in capital inflows.” (Ostry et al. 
2010: 15).  These controls are now considered among the toolkit of policy measures for 
dealing with adverse macroeconomic and financial consequences of surges in capital 
inflows, comprising fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies and prudential 
regulations.  Currency market interventions are also included in this toolkit and viewed in 
a much more positive light.  It is conceded that not only price stability but also exchange 
rate stability should be part of the objective function of central banks in small open 
economies (Blanchard et al. 2010: 13).    
 
However, the Fund’s thinking on capital controls is still ambivalent.  Restrictions 
over inflows are seen as justified only if a number of conditions are met – that is, if the 
economy is operating near potential, reserves are inadequate, the currency is undervalued 
and the flows are likely to be transitory.  Economic benefits of free international mobility 
of capital are reaffirmed, and controls are considered as exceptions, only a temporary 
countercyclical response to surges in inflows in countries that already have largely open 
capital accounts.  While it is recognized that “controls seem to be quite effective in 
countries that maintain extensive system of restrictions on most categories of flows”, 
those with “largely open capital accounts” are not advised to go in that direction but use 
such controls as last resort (Ostry et al. 2010: 5).    
 
The policies advocated by the IMF as alternatives to capital controls and the 
conditions under which capital controls are said to be useful are contentious.
4  Operation 
of the economy below capacity does not justify a hands-off approach to capital inflows.  
Short-term inflows at such times may bring income gains, but experience suggests that 
such gains tend to be more than offset by contractions that could result from a possible 
reversal.  Again, because of the large carry costs involved, allowing short-term arbitrage 
capital to enter the economy and using them to accumulate (borrowed) reserves as self 
insurance against their exit is not necessarily a better option than restricting their entry.  
Lowering interest rates may not be an effective alternative to capital controls since 
Interest rate differentials are not the only reason for short-term inflows.  When they are 
attracted by quick windfalls from bubbles in asset markets, lower rates could simply add 
fuel to the fire.  Finally, there is always uncertainty if and to what extent a currency is 
appropriately aligned with the underlying fundamentals.  Thus, DEEs with large and 
persistent current account deficits are well advised to approach capital inflows with 
extreme caution and focus on building a sound payments position rather than financing 
them with foreign capital.    
 
The unorthodox messages contained in these IMF discharges, notably the call for 
greater tolerance for inflation, attention to asset and credit bubbles, and use of controls 
over capital inflows as legitimate tools of policy are carefully worded and qualified with 
                                                 
4  See the description in Ostry et al. (2010, Figure 1).  For discussion of many of the issues taken up in this 
paragraph, see Akyüz (2008). Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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several caveats.  As such, the turnaround in IMF pronouncements on these matters 
appears to be triggered not so much by thoughtful reflection of its staff as by the need to 
respond to growing challenges to its technical and intellectual competence and integrity.  
Therefore, the jury is still out on whether the lessons learned from this crisis will move 
the IMF away from the Washington Consensus and produce a fundamental improvement 
in the quality of the IMF’s economic and financial monitoring and policy advice to its 
members.         Research Papers  14 
 
III   IMF SURVEILLANCE AND MEMBERS’ OBLIGATIONS 
 
 
III.1    The Bretton Woods System 
 
Policies almost always play an important part in financial instability and crises.  
Misguided deregulation of financial markets and liberalization of the capital account and 
unsustainable macroeconomic and exchange rate policies are often the proximate causes 
of financial crises and currency and balance-of-payments instability.  This is true both for 
DEEs and advanced economies (AEs).  However, global repercussions of financial crises 
and currency instability in systemically important countries, notably those enjoying 
reserve-currency status, are much more profound and widespread than those in DEEs.   
Adverse external spillovers constitute the rationale for multilateral disciplines in national 
policy making, the more so the greater the degree of global economic integration.      
 
The architects of the Bretton Woods system recognized that multilateral discipline 
over national policies would call for enforceable obligations.  A gold-exchange standard 
was established for the dollar, which in effect restricted the ability of the US, as the 
country enjoying the reserve-currency status, to run deficits without limit.  Other 
countries were required to maintain their exchange rates within a narrow range of 
multilaterally negotiated par values.  They were allowed to change them only on 
authorization from the Fund.  An unauthorized change in par values would have enabled 
the Fund to withhold the member’s access to its resources and even to force the member 
to withdraw (Dam 1982: 90-93).  A scarce currency clause (Article VII) was introduced 
to secure symmetry in adjustment between surplus and deficit countries.  Thus, the 
currencies of surplus countries could be declared scarce, thereby allowing others to use 
discriminatory trade, exchange and capital measures against them.   
 
However, none of these obligations were strictly enforced under the Bretton 
Woods System (Bird and Willett 2007).  IMF oversight of exchange rate adjustments was 
effectively abandoned in 1949 when Britain undertook a unilateral devaluation in order to 
gain competitive advantage and write down its wartime debt without facing punishment.  
The US ignored the limits set by the gold-exchange standard on its deficits and flooded 
the world economy with dollars, which eventually made it impossible to maintain gold 
convertibility.  The scarce currency clause was never used.  True that it had been 
introduced by the British as a protection against a possible dollar shortage, and in the 
event it was not needed because of rapid expansion of US deficits and dollar supply.  
However, it was still not invoked for Germany and Japan whose persistent surpluses 
made an important contribution to the collapse of the exchange rate arrangements.   
 
The par value arrangements collapsed with the unilateral suspension by the US of 
gold convertibility in 1971 – the first and the most significant post-war default of 
international obligations by any country without facing a penalty.   Floating was adopted 
without any credible commitment to exchange rate stability.  Indeed the new “obligations Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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regarding exchange arrangements” established with the Second Amendment of the 
Articles in 1978 amounted to no more than the recognition that the stability of the 
international monetary system depended on the extent to which domestic policies 
sustained orderly underlying conditions.  As pointed out by Triffin (1976: 47–48), the 
obligations were “so general and obvious as to appear rather superfluous” and the system 
“essentially proposed to legalize … the widespread and illegal repudiation of Bretton 
Woods commitments, without putting any other binding commitments in their place.” 
 
 
III.2    Bilateral and multilateral surveillance 
 
With the abrogation of the par value system the IMF surveillance gained critical 
importance.  At the same time as members were allowed the right to choose their own 
exchange rate arrangements, the Fund was charged to exercise firm surveillance over 
members’ exchange rate policies.  Over time the scope of bilateral surveillance has 
expanded into a number of other areas.  In the 1980s it was recognized that “to be 
effective surveillance over exchange rates must concern itself with the assessment of all 
the policies that affect trade, capital movements, external adjustment, and the effective 
functioning of the international monetary system.”5  After a series of crises in emerging 
economies it was agreed in April 1998 that the Fund Ashould intensify its surveillance of 
financial sector issues and capital flows, giving particular attention to policy 
interdependence and risks of contagion, and ensure that it is fully aware of market views 
and perspectives.6 Various codes and standards have been established for 
macroeconomic policy, institutional and market structure, and financial regulation and 
supervision have become important components of the surveillance process. The 2007 
Surveillance Decision delineated the full scope of surveillance, including all areas of 
policy that impinge directly and indirectly on external stability (IMF 2009e).   
 
As recognized by the IMF (2010c: 5), unlike bilateral surveillance – the so-called 
Article IV consultations – the meaning and scope of multilateral surveillance are not well 
articulated.  The Fund was charged by the Second Amendment to “oversee the 
international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation” but no 
“substantive obligations of the members are identified” and “the Fund has never spelled 
out what its systemic oversight … entails by way of process, substance, and data – either 
for itself or for its members” (IMF 2010a: 4).  And “in contrast to bilateral surveillance, 
there is no comprehensive Executive Board Decision providing guidance for this half 
sentence reference to multilateral surveillance” (IMF 2010g: 5). 
   
The focus of multilateral surveillance should, in principle, be the global spillovers 
and systemic interactions of national policies.  In discharging this function, the Fund 
should be able to request its members to make policy adjustments when their policies 
lead to global imbalances or produce external destabilizing spillovers transmitted through 
                                                 
5 Group of Ten (1985: para 40).   For further discussion, see Akyüz and Dell (1987). 
6 IMF Interim Committee Communiqué of 16 April 1998; Washington, D.C. Research Papers  16 
balance of payments or other channels.  However, from a legal point of view there are no 
obligations of Fund members to undertake policy actions to enhance systemic stability 
unless they are also necessary for their own stability.  In other words, each member is 
required to promote systemic stability only by promoting its own domestic stability and 
“for the Fund to have a power to require changes in members’ domestic policies when 
these negatively affect the system as a whole but not their own domestic stability, a 
change in the Articles of Agreement would be required.” (IMF 2010c: 16).   
 
This effectively implies there are no legal grounds for the Fund to request surplus 
countries – such as Germany, Japan and China – to make policy adjustments.  Similarly, 
financial shocks transmitted to other countries cannot come under the Fund’s bilateral 
surveillance if they do not endanger domestic and external stability of the country taking 
the policy action.  Thus, a hike in US interest rates or a rapid expansion of liquidity 
would be quite legitimate if it is compatible with the domestic and external stability of 
the US even if these wreak havoc in other countries.  
     
The contrast with the international trading system is striking.  Obligations in the 
trading system generally restrict beggar-my-neighbour policies that could inflict damage 
on other countries, regardless of their domestic consequences.  This is not the case with 
IMF obligations despite the wide recognition that adverse international spillovers from 
monetary and financial policies in systemically important economies tend to be much 
more damaging than those from trade policies.  Even the obligation to “avoid 
manipulating exchange rates” has no practical value in view of the freedom granted to 
members to choose whatever exchange regimes they wished.   
    
In practice the IMF has paid little attention to international spillovers from 
policies in systemically important countries even as it encouraged the DEEs to rapidly 
integrate into the international financial system, increasing their susceptibility to external 
shocks.  Nor has it been effective in bringing about coordinated policy adjustments in 
major deficit and surplus countries. During 2006-07 it initiated a process of “multilateral 
consultations” with systemically important countries to address global imbalances, but 
this did not produce the policy coordination needed.  The G20 launched a Mutual 
Assessment Process in 2009 to secure economic policy collaboration and to complement 
Fund surveillance.  The first report based on policy scenarios by the IMF was discussed 
in the Toronto Summit in June 2010, and a general agreement was reached on the need 
for AEs to communicate growth-friendly fiscal consolidation plans, for surplus countries 
to focus more on domestic sources of growth and for deficit AEs to take action for 
boosting national savings.  It is now also agreed that IMF reports and Article IV 
consultations would address global spillovers from national policies of the US, EU, 
China, Japan and the UK, the issuers of five major currencies.  However, no mechanism 
has been proposed to secure that policy action would be taken to mitigate adverse global 
spillovers.   
 
While the IMF members have the same obligations to maintain orderly 
macroeconomic and balance-of-payments conditions and stable exchange rates, the 
Fund’s policy oversight is confined primarily to its poorest members who need to draw Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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on its resources because of their lack of access to private finance and, occasionally, to 
emerging economies experiencing interruptions in their access to international financial 
markets.  For its borrowers the policy advice given by the IMF in Article IV consultations 
often provide the framework for the conditionality to be attached to any future Fund 
program (IMF/GIE 1999: 20).  But its surveillance of the policies of the most important 
players in the global system has no real meaning.   
 
 
III.3    Reform of IMF surveillance and members’ obligations  
 
III.3.1 Independent surveillance 
A key question is, therefore, how to improve the quality, effectiveness and 
evenhandedness of IMF surveillance.  The London Summit of the G20 (2009; para 12) 
expressed its support for “candid, even-handed, and independent IMF surveillance”, but 
without specific recommendations as to how to achieve these.   Subsequently the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) reaffirmed the emphasis on 
“candor, evenhandedness, and independence” and the need “to enhance the effectiveness 
of surveillance” (IMF 2009d: para 11).  However these undertakings have little 
credibility since the IMFC is known to have come up with similar pronouncements in 
almost every other meeting, particularly those held after episodes of instability in 
international currency and financial markets.
7  
 
There can be little doubt that problems regarding the quality, effectiveness and 
evenhandedness of IMF surveillance cannot be resolved without addressing its 
governance related shortcomings.  On one view, considerable progress can be made by 
overhauling and downsizing the Board to make it more representative and effective, and 
giving greater independence to Executive Directors vis-à-vis their capitals and to the IMF 
secretariat vis-à-vis its governing bodies.
8   
 
This view has been taken further by a senior British Treasury official who 
proposed a formal separation of surveillance from decisions about program lending (Balls 
2003).  It is argued that the current structure of the IMF treats program design as an 
extension of surveillance, but the lack of a clear distinction between lending and 
                                                 
7  For instance, in September 2000 the Committee emphasized “enhancing Fund surveillance, and 
promoting stability and transparency in the financial sector”: in April 2002 it encouraged the Fund “to press 
ahead with the range of recent initiatives designed to enhance the effectiveness of surveillance and crisis 
prevention, including the Financial Sector Assessment Program”: in October 2004 it allocated four 
paragraphs on “making surveillance more effective and strengthening crisis prevention”; and in April 2006 
it proposed a “new framework for IMF surveillance” which included, inter alia, making the staff 
“accountable for the quality of surveillance”.   
8 For a discussion of these issues see Cottarelli (2005); van Houtven (2004); and Kelkar et al. (2005).  
Some of these elements of governance reform have also been emphasized, to varying degrees, by the three 
former Managing Directors of the Fund, De Larosière, Camdessus and Köhler in IMF (2004).  Research Papers  18 
surveillance activities creates the wrong incentives and diminishes the effectiveness of 
surveillance.  Moreover, there is currently no formal regular mechanism for assessing 
whether the Fund is providing objective, rigorous, and consistent standards of 
surveillance across all member countries.  While responsible for ensuring the 
effectiveness of the Fund's activities, Executive Directors also have responsibilities to 
their authorities.  This creates a conflict of interest where Executive Directors tend to 
collude in surveillance in defence of the countries they represent, turning peer pressure 
into peer protection.  Surveillance should thus rest with authorities who are independent 
of their governments and who are not involved in lending decisions.  This would also 
have the advantage of protecting the Board and IMF management from being dragged 




  Such a step could indeed help improve the quality of surveillance.  Publication of 
independent surveillance reports and a wider debate over policy could help prevent build 
up of fragilities and vulnerabilities by providing signals to market participants and 
creating public pressure on governments in need of corrective action.  However, in the 
absence of binding commitments, it would still be difficult to encourage major non-
borrowing governments to heed the policy advice emerging from the surveillance 
process.   Credible commitments and enforceable obligations regarding exchange rates 
and international adjustment appear indispensable for a reasonable degree of international 
monetary and financial stability.    
 
III.3.2 Exchange rate obligations 
While a return to the par value system of the Bretton Woods is not feasible, there 
are ways and means of establishing more flexible but stable international regimes.  One 
such proposal is target zones for the three major reserve currencies, namely the dollar, the 
euro and the yen, advocated during the 1980s and 1990s by several people, including 
former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Paul Volcker.
10  While there are 
differences among specific proposals for target zones, including the width of the bands, 
adjustment and intervention rules and policy assignments, they generally envisage an 
agreement among the G3 on a set of exchange rate ranges compatible with sustainable 
external payment positions.  The agreed target zones should be wide enough to 
accommodate moderately divergent policies and adjusted as warranted by changes in 
underlying fundamentals.  Targets would be defended by individual or joint interventions 
and monetary policy actions as and when necessary.   
 
                                                 
9  Stern (2009) makes a similar proposal for an institution run by politically independent technocrats, as an 
unbiased risk assessor to provide early warning about systemically important economies. 
10  For various target zones proposals see, Williamson (1985, 1998), Williamson and Miller 1987), Volcker 
(1995) and McKinnon (1997).   For an assessment and comparison, see Clarida (1999). Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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While there would be technical difficulties in estimating exchange rate bands 
compatible with sustained external positions, such judgments are often expressed by the 
IMF regarding exchange rates of members drawing on its resources as well as during 
bilateral consultations as called for by the 2007 Decision (IMF 2009e).  The main 
difficulty is whether a reasonable degree of exchange rate stability could be reached 
under a regime of free capital movements while retaining policy autonomy for achieving 
objectives such as price stability, rapid growth and high employment.  By virtue of the 
so-called impossible trinity, it is widely agreed that even if major governments commit 
themselves to maintaining relative stable exchange rates within multilaterally agreed 
bands and are prepared to undertake joint interventions to prevent instability and 
misalignments, they may be overwhelmed by the size and speed of international capital 
movements.
11  Retaining policy autonomy may require the bands to be too wide to secure 
meaningful exchange rate stability while too narrow bands may not stand market 
pressures if the degree of policy coordination needed is not forthcoming, as seen during 
1992–93 in the European Monetary System.
12  Therefore, any multilateral commitments 
for exchange rates may need to be accompanied by control over short-term, arbitrage 
capital flows in order to broaden the space for policy to address domestic policy 
objectives while attaining exchange rate stability.
13  This would be quite in line with 
Article VI which specifically recognizes that members may exercise such controls as are 
necessary to regulate international capital movements and that regulation of capital flows 
is an important element of the international monetary system (IMF 2010b: 14).    
 
Since swings in major currencies have often been an important source of 
instability for DEEs, a credible and effective regime of target zones would certainly be 
beneficial to them.  However, the benefits of increased stability of these currencies may 
come at the cost of increased instability of interest rates and this could create difficulties 
for DEEs in managing capital flows, debt and exchange rates of their own currencies 
(Reinhart and Reinhart 2002).  Interest rate fluctuations needed to maintain exchange 
rates within target zones can be significantly reduced by controls over short-term flows, 
thereby widening the policy space in the AEs concerned and helping create a stable 
environment for DEEs.  
 
The target zones proposals, as originally formulated in the 1980s and 1990s, were 
confined primarily to the G3 currencies, leaving other countries free to pursue their own 
exchange rate regimes as they felt fit.  This was based on an implicit assumption that 
                                                 
11 According to impossible trinity, it is not possible to pursue simultaneously an independent monetary 
policy, control the exchange rate, and maintain an open capital account.  All three are potentially feasible, 
but only two of them could be chosen as actual policy.  For a discussion that this trilemma is not absolute, 
see Akyüz (2009).  
12  On the degree of coordination needed and the consequent loss of policy autonomy under target zones, 
see Akyüz and Dell (1987) and Clarida (1999).  
13  In order to counter arbitrage flows interest equalization taxes were used in the US in the early 1960s and 
negative interest rates on foreign deposits were used in Switzerland in the early 1970s; see Swoboda 
(1976).  The more recent equivalent of such measures is the unremunerated reserve requirements. Research Papers  20 
other countries taken individually, or as a group if they acted collectively, were 
sufficiently small not to disrupt the fundamental equilibrium exchange rates among the 
three reserve currencies.  Since then, however, China has emerged as a major player, the 
number one exporter and the largest surplus economy.  Moreover, because of the central 
role that China plays in the East Asian production network, its exchange rate policies 
exert a wider influence.  For this reason, any multilateral discipline with respect to 
exchange rates cannot exclude China. 
 
III.3.3  Removing the asymmetry in adjustment 
The second area where effective multilateral discipline is needed concerns 
adjustment by surplus and deficit countries.   Under the current arrangements surplus 
countries as well as reserve-issuer deficit countries, notably the US, do not face any 
pressure for adjustment and there are no enforceable multilateral obligations in this area.  
An agreement on target zone among major economies would not by itself resolve the 
issue of who should adjust in the event of large current account imbalances.  Moreover, 
asymmetry in adjustment is also a central concern to other countries, notably the DEEs.  
 
One way of inducing surplus countries to adjust is by activating the scarce 
currency clause and authorizing the others to apply restrictive trade and capital account 
measures.  However, this would not only run against insurmountable political opposition 
but also serious practical difficulties regarding the nature and extent of the sanctions each 
and every country would be entitled to apply.  A softer alternative is provided by Keynes’ 
International Clearing Union proposal.  According to this scheme the countries running 
large deficits would pay interest on their drawings (overdrafts) on the Clearing Union 
while at the same time undertaking adjustment, including currency devaluations.   
Similarly, large surplus countries would be subject to a charge on their balances in the 
Clearing Union and required to appreciate their currencies.  This latter feature of Keynes’ 
proposal can be adapted to current conditions in that countries running persistent 
surpluses in excess of a certain threshold in terms of GDP could be required to pay taxes 
into a fund.
14    
 
In setting such thresholds for surplus countries attention should be paid to a 
number of factors since causes and effects of surpluses can differ considerably.
15 The 
details would thus require considerable attention, but perhaps the most important 
objective that should govern such an arrangement is to discourage surpluses that 
constitute a major source of deflation and instability for the world economy.   
 
In the October 2010 meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers the US Treasury 
Secretary made a proposal along these lines, to limit the G20 countries’ surpluses and 
                                                 
14 This proposal is revisited by Eichengreen (2009) who suggests that such a tax can be paid to the IMF.     
15  This is pointed out by the IMF Managing Director in relation to the US proposal discussed below – see 
IMF (2010h).  Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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deficits to 4 per cent of their GDPs.  This is a clear recognition that current global 
imbalances cannot be resolved simply by activating the scarce currency clause and 
compelling the three largest surplus economies, China, Germany and Japan, to adjust 
while leaving the US off the hook.  An orderly international adjustment would no doubt 
require Germany and Japan to grow faster by expanding domestic demand and China to 
substitute domestic consumption for exports (Akyuz 2010).  However, current global 
trade imbalances result as much from the behaviour of the largest deficit economy, the 
US, which has been exploiting its “exorbitant privilege” as the issuer of the dominant 
reserve currency.  As long as the US continues to live beyond its means, the rest of the 
world as a whole would need to run a trade surplus, and policy adjustments outside the 
US would simply determine the distribution of that surplus among countries.   
 
The US proposal envisages no mechanisms for encouraging or compelling 
countries to undertake necessary adjustments to comply with the limits, but only 
voluntary cooperation.  Even if it is agreed by all the parties concerned, without an 
enforcement mechanism its chances of producing tangible results would be slim.  For 
surplus countries a tax-based scarce currency clause may provide a market-friendly 
incentive for adjustment.  However, since the dominant reserve issuer, the US, does not 
face any significant pressure for adjustment, restricting its deficits would depend very 
much on removing its exorbitant privilege by reforming the international reserves system.   
In other words, a central objective of the reform of the reserves system would be to 
facilitate international adjustment. 
 
III.3.4 Capital account obligations and surveillance 
The Articles do not give an explicit mandate to the IMF on capital account 
policies of its members.  In the 1990s there were attempts to extend the mandate of the 
Fund to capital account transactions by establishing obligations for members to liberalize 
capital movements subject to some safeguards.  Now that controls over inflows are 
recognized by the IMF as a legitimate component of policy response to capital surges, an 
issue raised is the role that the IMF could play in the regulation of capital flows.   
 
The IMF (2010b: 15) argues for a broad mandate: “Given the fact that the Fund is 
charged with providing financing to address crises that may be caused by premature 
liberalization, it may be particularly appropriate for the Fund to play a central role in 
determining when liberalization supports—or undermines—stability of members and the 
overall system.”   One way of ensuring this is by giving the IMF the power to authorize 
both liberalization and controls.  However, this carries significant risks given the IMF’s 
continued inclination towards open capital account regimes noted above.  Other ways and 
means should be found for the Fund to promote controls over destabilizing capital surges 
in the context of Article IV consultations as a way of preventing exchange rate and 
balance of payments instability, rather than giving it a broad mandate that could restrict 
the ability of DEEs to exercise control.  
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The Articles of the IMF not only recognize the right of members to regulate 
international capital flows but also authorize the Fund to request them to exercise control.  
The 1977 surveillance decision mentions, among the developments that might indicate 
the need for discussion with a member, the behaviour of the exchange rate that appears to 
be unrelated to underlying economic and financial conditions including factors affecting 
competitiveness and long-term capital movements. The 1995 amendment explicitly refers 
to “unsustainable flows of private capital” as an event triggering such discussion.   
 
These require that surveillance should include sustainability of a country’s 
external balance sheet and hence effective management of external liabilities.  As 
discussed in Section E, restrictions over capital outflows should become legitimate tools 
of policy at times of crises as part of orderly debt workout mechanisms.  In the same 
vein, guidelines for IMF surveillance should specify circumstances in which the Fund 
should actually request the imposition or strengthening of controls over inflows. 
   
For countries operating under Fund programs, conditionality should include 
control over destabilizing capital surges.  In the past the Fund not only refrained from 
doing this, but in fact supported exchange-based stabilization programs relying on short-
term capital inflows.  The key issue is, however, how to increase the leverage of the Fund 
on capital account policies in non-program countries relying on destabilizing surges in 
capital flows and reduce the likelihood of costly crises and bailouts.  While many 
countries are now approaching such surges with greater caution, there are several which 
still continue to rely on them, allowing sharp appreciations and mounting trade 
imbalances.  One option would be to restrict future access to IMF resources under 
Exceptional Access Policy for countries not heeding the advice for control over surges 
during Article IV consultations.  This could also help slowdown the surge in capital 




IV     THE INTERNATIONAL RESERVES SYSTEM 
 
 
IV.1   Instability  and  imbalances 
 
An international reserves system based on a national currency as a means of 
international settlement and a reserve asset faces serious dilemmas irrespective of 
exchange rate arrangements and the regime for international capital movements 
accompanying such a system.  Triffin (1960) pointed to a paradox in the Bretton Woods 
system, which could bring its viability in to question: that is, it would be impossible to 
rely on the dollar for the provision of international liquidity and at the same time fix its 
value in terms of gold when the global economy and demand for liquidity are expanding 
rapidly.  In such a system the net holding of dollar assets by the rest of the world would 
depend on the US running current account deficits.  If the US stopped running deficits, 
the shortage of international liquidity would stifle growth and make it difficult for other 
countries to maintain parity.  If, on the other hand, the US runs growing deficits and 
supplies adequate international liquidity to the rest of the world, the accumulation of 
liabilities could eventually undermine the confidence in the dollar, making it difficult to 
maintain its value vis-à-vis gold.      
 
In a world of free international capital mobility, net dollar holdings by the rest of 
the world no longer depend on US current account deficits.  The rest of the world can 
increase its net holding of dollar assets as long as the US is willing to increase its holding 
of foreign-currency assets through investment abroad.  In such a case the accumulation of 
dollar liabilities will be matched by increases in US holding of foreign assets.  There 
would be no deterioration of the net asset position of the US or increases in the global 
stock of dollar liabilities relative to other currencies.  However, for the rest of the world 
to acquire safe U.S. Treasuries, the US government would need to run budget deficits or 
should be willing to acquire foreign assets in exchange for Treasury bills and bonds.  
Otherwise, reserves would have to be kept in risky securities of US corporations, 
exposing reserve holders to default.   
 
The Triffin paradox, as it was originally formulated, disappeared with the move to 
floating exchange rates and free capital movements, but the problem of instability did 
not.   This is because the US deficits are no longer constrained by the obligation to 
maintain gold convertibility, and floating cannot restrict its ability and temptation to live 
beyond its means as long as demand for reserves by the rest of the world continues to 
expand, particularly as a result of faster growth in lesser developed economies.     
 
Dollar domination has continued after the move to floating exchange rates, rapid 
growth of international financial markets and capital flows.   The share of the dollar in 
non-gold official reserves has remained far above the share of the US in the global 
economy, falling only from 70 per cent at the time of the suspension of gold 
convertibility to some 65 per cent at present.  The rise of Germany and Japan as industrial Research Papers  24 
powers did not challenge the dominance of the dollar.  As explained by the IMF historian 
Boughton (2001: 937) Germany and Japan “were reluctant to see their currencies 
‘internationalized’ and used as reserves …  Moreover, the prospec t  o f  a  s y s t e m  o f  
multiple reserve currencies was widely viewed, both inside and outside the Fund, as a 
potentially destabilizing development that was to be avoided if possible.”   
 
After the demise of the par values the US has continued to run its policies in 
pursuit of domestic objectives of growth and price stability, to the benign neglect of the 
external value of the dollar.  As a result, its current account has been highly unstable, and 
the dollar has gone through several gyrations vis-à-vis other reserve currencies.  These 
have produced considerable swings in international capital flows and instability in the 
exchange rates and balance-of-payments of DEEs.        
 
With the Second Amendment the IMF was given the responsibility of conducting 
surveillance over its members’ policies on reserve assets (Article VII).  While each 
member was required to collaborate with the Fund to ensure that its reserve policies are 
“consistent with the objectives of promoting better international surveillance of 
international liquidity and making the special drawing right the principle reserve asset in 
the international monetary system”, this provision is devoid of any content with respect to 
the scope of obligations of IMF members (IMF 2010b).   
 
 
IV.2    Reserve costs  
 
After the collapse of the par value system, the need for reserves was expected to 
ease as countries gained access to international financial markets and became more 
willing to respond to external shocks by adjustments in exchange rates.  However, greater 
access to international finance and capital account liberalization in DEEs have produced 
exactly the opposite result by giving rise to accumulation of large stocks of external 
liabilities and growing presence of foreigners in domestic securities markets, thereby 
making them highly vulnerable to sudden stops and reversals of capital flows.  This has 
necessitated self insurance, particularly after the 1997 Asian crisis when it became clear 
that the only collective insurance available, namely IMF lending, was highly unreliable 
and orderly debt workout mechanisms that could prevent meltdown were unlikely to 
develop.  
 
While traditionally reserves covering three months of imports were considered 
adequate for addressing the liquidity problems arising from time lags between payments 
for imports and receipts from exports, it has become a common wisdom that in order to 
avoid a liquidity crisis, international reserves in DEEs should at least meet their short-
term external liabilities.
16  At the end of 2009 total international reserves of DEEs reached 
                                                 
16 This is known as Guidotti-Greenspan rule.  ESCAP (2010: 20) argues that a “more precise yardstick of 
vulnerability encompasses the measurement of overall gross external liabilities of a country that are most 
clearly reversible and measurable.  The components of such an approach are short-term debt, the stock of 
portfolio inflows and the magnitude of imports over three months.”  Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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some $5.5 trillion, exceeding 12 months of imports.  About half of these are earned from 
current account surpluses, mainly by China and Fuel Exporters, and the rest came from 
capital inflows – that is, they are borrowed reserves.
17  In a few countries such as China, 
current account surpluses and reserve accumulation have been associated with rapid 
growth.  But in a large number of DEEs additional reserves were built from capital 
inflows as governments intervened to prevent currency appreciations and weakening of 
payments positions.  Similarly, many commodity exporters have put aside part of the 
growing export proceeds and restricted domestic spending and growth for fear that, in the 
absence of self-insurance, an eventual downturn in commodity prices could lead to 
virulent crises. 
 
These reserves are invested in low-yielding assets, mainly the US Treasury bills 
and bonds.  On the basis of average historical spreads between the borrowing rate and 
return earned on reserves, the annual carry cost of borrowed reserves alone to DEEs can 
be estimated to be in the order of some $130 billion.  This constitutes a net transfer of 
resources to reserve issuers, notably the US, and exceeds total official development 
assistance to developing countries.
18  The cost borne by DEEs would be greater if 
allowance is made for foregone growth by putting export surpluses into US Treasuries 
rather than investment and imports.   
 
 
IV.3    Reducing reserve needs 
 
There are several ways of reducing reserve needs of DEEs and hence costs in 
resource transfer to reserve-issuers and foregone growth.  First, measures that reduce the 
volatility of capital flows would also help diminish the need for self insurance.  They 
include effective surveillance over monetary and financial policies of systemically 
important countries which exert a significant influence on the size and direction of 
international capital flows.  They also include regulation of capital flows, particularly 
control over short-term surges; as noted, it may be better to stop them entering the 
economy than to cover them with costly reserves.  There is no multilateral obligation 
preventing countries from using such controls.  As discussed, the Fund should also 
encourage them to control surges through conditionality and Article IV consultations.  
 
Second, orderly debt workout mechanisms including internationally sanctioned 
temporary debt standstills and exchange controls would reduce the need for international 
liquidity at times of sudden stops and exits.   
 
                                                 
17 Borrowed” in the sense that they accompany increased claims by non-residents in one form or another, 
including direct and portfolio equity investment, which entail outward income transfers.   
18 The method used here to estimate reserve costs differs from that in the literature in that a distinction is 
made here between borrowed and earned reserves.  Polak and Clark (2006) also refer to borrowed reserves 
in their estimation of the cost to poorest developing countries. Research Papers  26 
Third, pooling of reserves at the regional level could reduce total reserves held by 
the participating countries while providing adequate collective insurance.  A recent 
example is the Chiang Mai Initiative with a reserve pool of $120 billion for meeting the 
temporary liquidity needs of the ASEAN+3 countries.   
 
Finally, more reliable and adequate official financing at times of instability will 
reduce the need for self insurance.  However, as discussed in the next section, such 
lending should aim primarily at financing current account transactions rather than capital 
outflows and debt payments to international private creditors – the latter should be 
tackled mainly by mechanisms designed to involve the private sector in crisis resolution.  
In any case, as recognized by the staff of the IMF (Mateos y Lago et al. 2009), even if the 
IMF’s lending capacity is significantly increased and tailored to instability in global 
economic conditions, the Fund is unlikely to elicit greater confidence among DEEs and 
persuade them to give up self insurance unless its governance structure becomes 
significantly more dependable.     
 
 
IV.4    Moving away from the dollar towards the SDRs 
 
  The solution to many of the problems associated with a reserves system 
dominated by a national currency should be sought primarily on the supply side.  Going 
back to the gold standard is not an attractive and politically feasible option.  Nor is a 
single global currency replacing all national currencies or the currencies of “rich 
democracies” (Cooper 2006).   
 
That leaves two alternatives.  The first one is to end the dominance of the dollar 
by promoting some other national currencies as perfectly substitutable reserve currencies.  
This has been happening to a limited extent with the euro and the Chinese yuan may soon 
emerge as a serious competitor to the dollar.  However, while policies can promote the 
internationalization of a currency, the emergence of a currency as a perfectly 
substitutable reserve asset depends on a host of conditions that cannot be readily changed 
by policy, including deep and liquid financial and foreign exchange markets, 
macroeconomic stability and large share of the country in question in international trade.  
  
Besides, it is not clear if a multi-currency system would be more stable than a 
reserves system dominated by a single national currency.  On one view, it could promote 
better stability by imposing policy discipline over the dominant reserve issuer.   On 
another, it could result in greater instability by allowing central banks to shift the 
composition of their portfolios to optimize expected return.  In any case a multiple 
reserve currency system would not eliminate the problems of deflationary bias and 
resources transfers from DEEs.   
  
The second alternative is to establish a global reserve currency to exist side by 
side with national currencies.  This could be arranged in several different ways, as 
elucidated by United Nations (2009).  One option is to introduce a new global reserve 
currency, like Keynes’s bancor, exchangeable with national currencies at fixed rates, Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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issued by a global central bank to provide countries liquidity for international payments 
clearance as well as overdraft facilities.
19  However, building on existing mechanisms and 
institutions and a gradual move towards the SDRs (or expanded SDRs) appears to be a 
more practical solution to several, if not all, problems of the dollar-based system.  
 
SDRs no doubt present a more stable alternative to dollar holdings for DEEs by 
allowing diversification even though their expanded role in the system may not reduce 
instability among reserve currencies much more than that could be achieved by moving 
to a multi-currency solution.  Moreover, unlike dollar reserves, holding SDRs does not 
entail costs; cost is incurred only when they are used.  Under present arrangements SDRs 
are allocated to members in proportion to their quotas.  Members obtain or use SDRs 
through voluntary exchanges or by the Fund designating members with strong external 
positions to purchase SDRs from those wishing to use SDRs allocated to them.  When 
members’ holdings rise above or fall below their allocation, they earn or pay interest 
respectively, with the interest rate being determined as the weighted average of interest 
rates in money markets in the currencies constituting the SDRs.  
  
The cost advantage of SDRs has given rise to calls for regular distribution to poor 
countries to ease the burden of holding reserves.  Indeed, a former Director of Research 
of the IMF, Jacques Polak, argued that the only principle that should now guide the 
allocation of SDRs should be “the benefits of permitting low-income countries to acquire 
and hold reserves at a much lower interest rate than they would have to pay in the market 
and a reduced dependence of the system on borrowed reserves that are liable to be 
recalled when they are most needed” (Polak and Clark 2006: 553).    
 
Regular substantial allocations of SDRs are certainly the most straightforward 
way to raise their share in reserve assets and help address the inequities in the current 
system.  Allocations should be on a predetermined basis, linked to growth in world 
income and/or trade.  It could also be adjusted counter-cyclically, accelerated at times of 
global slowdown.  Using current quotas as the basis of allocation among countries would 
not raise the share of SDRs in reserve assets since a large portion would go to countries 
that do not need and use them.  Given their external vulnerability, developing countries 
have much greater need and demand for reserves and this should be taken into 
consideration in reaching a formula for the allocation of SDRs among countries.  On 
some proposals, all allocations could be given to developing countries (UN 2009: 116).   
 
Another way forward is to make the IMF an SDRs-based organization; that is, to 
have SDRs to replace quotas and GAB and NAB as the single source of funding for the 
IMF.  The Fund could be permitted to issue SDRs to itself on a regular basis, to be used 
                                                 
19 For a recent discussion of this proposal in relation to the current crisis see, Monbiot (2008).   Ironically 
this proposal is now revisited for addressing the problems associated with the dollar-based reserve system 
and the United States indebtedness while at the Bretton Woods it was opposed by the very same country 
because it was the biggest creditor at the time and Keynes was proposing taxing current account surpluses.  
In contrast, in a recent speech on Reform of the International Monetary System, proposing adoption of the 
SDRs as a global reserve currency, the governor of China, the country with the largest surplus, referred to 
Keynes’s bancor proposal as “farsighted”; see, Zhou (2009).    Research Papers  28 
in lending operations.  Again, this could be linked to growth in world income and/or 
trade.  Several issues of detail would still need to be worked out, but once an agreement 
is reached to replace traditional sources of funding with SDRs, the IMF could in fact be 
translated into a technocratic institution of the kind advocated by Keynes during the 
Bretton Woods negotiations.  Its funding would no longer be subjected to arduous and 
politically charged negotiations dominated by major industrial countries.  Nor would it 
need to borrow from some of its members in order to lend to others.  Such an 
arrangement could thus bring a considerable improvement to the governance of the IMF, 
allowing it to stay at equal distance to all its members and help to perform policy 
surveillance even-handedly and effectively. 
 
It is also possible to supplement these with a mechanism to remove the dollar 
overhang by allowing countries to replace their existing stocks of dollar reserves with 
SDRs without causing disruption in currency markets.  This is the proposal made by the 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China whereby the IMF would “set up an open-ended 
SDR-denominated fund based on the market practice, allowing subscription and 
redemption in the existing reserve currencies by various investors as desired” (Zhou 
2009).  
 
This proposal corresponds to what came to be known as the substitution account, 
extensively discussed in the IMF in two previous episodes of considerable dollar 
weaknesses, but abandoned for several reasons; first, in the early 1970s in the Committee 
of 20 in an effort to replace the Bretton Woods system by something more viable and 
then in the late 1970s and early 1980s as the dollar weakened considerably.
20  Under such 
an arrangement the IMF would issue interest-bearing certificates denominated in SDRs 
against dollar reserves handed over by central banks at the market exchange rate, and 
invest these reserves in interest-bearing US Treasury bonds.  The operation would not 
affect the total volume of international reserves but its composition.  Countries can use 
these certificates to settle international payments or acquire reserve currencies.  The 
substitution would result in a withdrawal of a large stock of dollar reserves from the 
market and put them into IMF coffers.  This would not only help diversify reserve 
holdings, but could reduce the risk of monetary turmoil that could result from occasional 
unloading of dollar reserves by central banks.
21  
  
Several issues of importance to DEEs would need to be sorted out.
22  First and 
foremost, there is the question of who will bear the exchange rate risk.  A change in the 
dollar/SDRs exchange rate would create losses and gains for the IMF since, by definition, 
a substitution account would mean a currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. A 
sustained decline in the dollar against other currencies that make up the SDRs will imply 
                                                 
20  For an account of these deliberations see, Boughton (2001: 936-43).  See also Bergsten (2009) 
21  Kenen (2005) suggests that a widespread unloading of dollar reserves into euro could be absorbed by 
establishing a similar substitution account at the European Central Bank. 
22  These are discussed in Boughton (2001, 2007) and Bergsten (2007a, 2007b). Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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losses.  The exposure of the Fund can be considerable if the account is open-ended, rather 
than restricted in size.  There is no guarantee that interest differentials between the dollar 
and SDRs would provide cover for such losses.
23   
 
In previous discussions of this proposal, the IMF gold was proposed to be used 
for cover.  But this would mean pushing the losses onto all members of the Fund, rich 
and poor alike.  If, on the other hand, the exchange rate risk were to be borne by holders 
of the SDRs, the operation would be meaningless − there would be no incentive for 
holders of dollar reserves to subscribe to the account.  An alternative would be for the US 
to bear the risk − that is, to supply more interest-bearing dollar assets to cover exchange 
losses if the dollar falls against the other currencies.  A more equitable solution would be 
to share the risk between the US and the Central Banks subscribing to the substitution 
account.   
 
It is often argued that SDRs cannot become a principal reserve asset without 
significantly expanding its private use.   An increased holding of SDRs as reserve assets 
would not be possible unless central banks can use them in currency interventions and 
diversification of their portfolios, and this calls for a deep and liquid market whereby 
banks and non-bank financial firms, as well governments issue and hold SDRs-based 
instruments.  This is necessary for the substitution account to be attractive to central 
banks, not only for replacing reserves held in dollars but also in other currencies.
24 
 
  SDRs can provide a more stable store of value in so far as they help impose 
spending discipline on reserve-currency issuers and restrict the deficits they can run.   
They would allow expansion of international liquidity without requiring the US to run 
ever growing deficits.  They would also reduce the cost of reserve holdings by DEEs.  
However, a shift from the dollar towards SDRs cannot address the deflationary bias in the 
global economy because of absence of effective arrangements for adjustment in surplus 
countries.  Indeed the deflationary bias may be aggravated because the US can no longer 
act as a locomotive and run growing deficits.  Consequently, any initiative to move away 
from the dollar as the dominant reserve currency should be accompanied by arrangements 
to ensure adjustment in surplus countries.  
                                                 
23  The IMF could invest dollar reserves into long-term Treasury bonds which normally carry higher 
interest rates.  But this would not necessarily cover the exchange rate losses.  
24  This requires a market maker, see Eichengreen (2009).  Research Papers  30 
 
V   C RISIS INTERVENTION AND LENDING 
 
 
V.1    Expansion and proliferation of crisis lending instruments 
  
The Fund is authorised by its Articles to lend from its General Resources Account 
(GRA) to its members facing balance-of-payments deficits and/or insufficient reserves so 
as to enable them to make necessary adjustments to resolve their payments difficulties.  
Except for reserve tranche purchases, such lending is subject to conditionality to ensure 
that the funds are used to resolve, rather than postpone, the payments difficulties and to 
protect the financial integrity of the IMF.  Originally access to the Fund was restricted to 
current account financing.  The Fund was prohibited to lend to meet sustained outflow of 
capital and empowered to compel a member to exercise capital controls as a condition for 
access to its resources.      
 
With increased payments instability and recurrent capital account crises in 
emerging economies resulting from their rapid integration into global financial markets, 
the distinction between current and capital account financing has been lost and the Fund 
has increasingly become a lender to countries experiencing rapid and sustained outflows 
of capital and difficulties in debt servicing to private creditors.  This role of crisis lending 
effectively started with the outbreak of the debt crisis in the 1980s when many 
developing countries borrowed heavily from multilateral sources to finance debt 
servicing to private creditors (Sachs 1998).   The more the IMF has failed in crisis 
prevention, the more it has become involved in crisis management and lending.  Indeed 
after almost every major financial crisis the IMF has sought a new role and this has 
almost always been construed in terms of expansion of its lending to countries facing 
difficulties in external debt servicing and maintaining an open capital account.  Efforts to 
expand crisis lending have not been matched by meaningful reforms to improve the 
quality and effectiveness of IMF surveillance and to introduce enforceable obligations in 
order to reduce the likelihood of crises with global repercussions.   
 
In the wake of the Mexican crisis the Managing Director of the IMF suggested to 
the Copenhagen Social Summit in March 1995 that an effective response to financial 
crises such as the Mexican one depended on “convincing our members to maintain, at the 
IMF level, the appropriate level of resources to be able to stem similar crises if they were 
to occur”, adding that this should lead to a decision in favour of “further work on the role 
the SDR could play in putting in place a last resort financial safety net for the world” 
(IMF Survey, 20 March 1995).    
 
A new lending device, the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), was created in 
response to the deepening of the East Asian crisis in December 1997 in order to provide 
financing above normal access limits to countries experiencing “exceptional short-term 




25  This was followed in Spring 1999 by the Contingency Credit Line (CCL) 
designed to provide a precautionary line of defence in the form of short-term financing 
which would be available to meet future balance-of-payments problems arising from 
contagion.  Simultaneously the Chief Economist of the IMF (Fischer 1999) suggested 
turning the Fund into an international lender of last resort, ready to provide liquidity to 
countries with sound policies so as to protect them against contagion and financial panic.  
The Exceptional Access Policy (EAP) adopted in 2002-03 allowed lending above limits 
to countries experiencing exceptional balance of payments pressure on the capital 
account.   
 
The CCL was discontinued in November 2003 because countries had avoided 
recourse to it owing to fears that it would give the wrong signal and impair their access to 
financial markets.  Again an alternative facility proposed in 2006, the Reserve 
Augmentation Line, based on prequalification and automatic access, was never activated 
because of concern over the prequalification process and adequacy of Fund’s resources.  
However, the current crisis has given the Fund reasons and opportunity for expanding its 
lending instruments and capacity.  With the deepening and global spread of the crisis it 
introduced in October 2008 the Short-term Liquidity Facility (SLF) for countries with 
“short-lived and self-correcting BOP needs arising from external market developments 
despite strong fundamentals”, with access based on ex-ante qualification with a cap of 
500 per cent of the quota.  This was subsequently replaced in March 2009 by the Flexible 
Credit Line (FCL) “for countries with strong fundamentals, policies and track records of 
policy implementation” to be assessed by the IMF according to several pre-determined 
criteria.  Unlike the SLF it can be used on a precautionary basis without any hard cap.  
The High-Access Precautionary Stand-By Arrangements (HAPAs) introduced for 
members who could not meet the FCL’s high qualification requirements have recently 
been replaced by a new Precautionary Credit Line (PCL), stipulating less demanding 
criteria for access.  
 
All these initiatives have been supported by a decision of the G20 to triple the 
resources of the IMF to $750 billion through expansion of borrowing from its major 
members, and to raise them further to $1 trillion under a reformed quota system.  The 
IMF is currently working with the government of Korea on a proposal for a global 
financial safety net including swap lines fashioned after those made available by the 
Federal Reserve to several emerging economies in the recent turmoil as well as 
multicountry lending under the FCL, to be discussed in the G20 summit in Seoul in 
November 2010.   
 
 
V.2    Pros and cons of crisis lending 
  
According to the Fund, its lending plays a key role in both crisis resolution and 
prevention.  In a country facing a serious shortage of international liquidity and capital 
account crisis because of rapid capital outflows and interruption of its access to 
                                                 
25  For a summary of various Fund GRA facilities, see IMF (2009a and 2010e).  Research Papers  32 
international financial markets, the availability of Fund’s resources would mitigate the 
burden of adjustment both by giving the country more time to adjust and by helping 
restore confidence (IMF 2009a: 12).  However, such lending is often accompanied by 
pro-cyclical conditionality, leading to significant losses of jobs and income.  Despite 
claims to the contrary, this still appears to be the case in current IMF programs in several 
European countries.  In many of these cases such as Greece, the funding provided by the 
IMF is serving to bail out creditor banks in more affluent European countries such as 
Germany, Switzerland and France, while fiscal tightening, austerity measures and other 
pro-cyclical policies accompanying IMF lending are increasing the risks to their 
economic recovery (Weisbrot and Montecino 2010).  
 
The IMF is now shifting emphasis from lending for “crisis resolution” towards 
lending for “crisis prevention” by offering precautionary credit lines under the FCL and 
PCL to qualified countries to protect them against speculative runs due to adverse 
spillovers from a crisis in a systemically important country.  Although this role is 
described as crisis prevention, such lending is found necessary because of the failure of 
the IMF to forewarn and prevent systemic crises – such as the one triggered by the 
subprime debacle – in the first place.  The ex ante conditionality provided by the pre-
qualification criteria is expected to encourage countries to pursue sound policies, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of such a run.  The automaticity of access to adequate IMF 
financing is also expected to mitigate the need for self-insurance through large stock of 
reserves and hence reduce the associated costs and imbalances.  Indeed, the recent 
proposal to bolster international financial safety nets appears to contain a provision to cap 
countries’ foreign exchange reserves in return for their access to IMF-anchored currency 
swaps (Narendranath and Venu 2010).        
 
   Such an expansion of crisis lending also creates a number of difficulties.  First of 
all, it leads to a further fragmentation of IMF membership by creating different categories 
in terms of their eligibility of access to GRA.  Although differentiation is practiced in the 
access of countries to different facilities introduced over time to address specific 
problems, such as the Compensatory Financing Facility established to offset export 
shortfalls and the Extended Fund Facility for structural payments imbalances, and the 
Fund is given discretion in determining the size of access, the ongoing reform of lending 
instruments and practices would imply that the IMF could become an institution 
primarily for a small number of more prosperous emerging economies.      
 
  Second, in differentiating among different classes of members in terms of their 
eligibility to access to precautionary lending, the Fund would effectively be acting as a 
credit rating agency.  However, the past record of the IMF in anticipating crises, issuing 
early warnings and distinguishing between solvency and liquidity problems is not very 
encouraging, and definitely not better than private rating agencies.  This would have 
implications for its financial integrity since, unlike these agencies, the IMF would be 
putting its money where its mouth is.  The claim that it enjoys a preferred creditor status 
(IMF 2009a) has no legal basis.  It is true that in Paris Club debt restructuring exercises 
official bilateral creditors have been willing to exempt the Fund from the restructuring 
process.  However, this status has not always been accepted by private creditors.  Thus, Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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the “IMF could be party in any insolvency court or insolvency proceeding by arbitration.  
No right to preference of any kind exists” (Raffer 2009: 7).  On the other hand, the 
suggestion that the IMF could protect its financial integrity at least in part by lending 
against collateral (IMF 2010a: 9 and 2010b: 19-20) has little practical value.         
 
Third, since risks assumed by the IMF would not be identical even among the 
countries within the same category, it would need to differentiate charges to price them 
properly.  However, this is not permitted under Article V, which requires that the rate of 
charge arising from the Fund’s holdings of members’ currencies must be “uniform for all 
members” (IMF 2010b: 18).   
 
Fourth, in order to reduce risks and protect its financial integrity, the IMF would 
need to constantly monitor the fulfilment of conditions for access to ensure that the 
pressures on the capital account of a qualifying country have resulted from a sudden loss 
of confidence amongst investors triggered largely by external factors rather than 
macroeconomic and financial mismanagement.  In these respects difficulties are likely to 
emerge in relations between the Fund and the member concerned since such an 
assessment would involve considerable discretion on the part of the IMF.  It would also 
open the door to political influence by its major shareholders, particularly when the level 
of access is not fixed.  On the other hand, Maastricht-like pre-qualification criteria could 
create more problems than they resolve. 
 
  Fifth, precautionary credit lines can also aggravate the pro-cyclical behaviour of 
financial markets.  Countries that meet the prequalification criteria could experience 
surges in capital inflows which could lead to currency appreciations and current account 
imbalances and thus undermine the conditions that allowed eligibility to such lending in 
the first place.  By contrast, others could come under more intense pressures from a 
systemic crisis simply because they are not eligible to precautionary credit lines.  
 
Finally, crisis lending by the IMF often leads to an unequal burden-sharing 
between creditors and debtors.  When funds are used to pay off debt to private creditors, 
sovereign commercial debt gets replaced by debt to the IMF which is often more difficult 
to renegotiate.  Moreover, private debt gets dumped on the public sector – sovereign debt 
invariably rises after financial crises resulting from excessive build up of debt by the 
private sector.  All these create moral hazard and prevent operation of market discipline, 
because they allow investors and creditors to escape without bearing the full 
consequences of the risks they have undertaken.     
  
In discussing the pros and cons of crisis lending, the IMF (2009a: 15) recognizes 
that official financing could end up financing larger private outflows and this could lead 
to creditor moral hazard.  However, its attention is predominantly focussed on the debtor 
moral hazard.  In the assessment of “risks with crisis prevention instruments” no mention 
is made of creditor moral hazard, but concern is expressed that “members may be 
tempted to use excessively large precautionary arrangements to overinsure against 
risks thus leading to moral hazard.”  However, this is also underplayed on grounds that 
earning the privilege of rapid and upfront access to Fund resources would provide Research Papers  34 
adequate incentives for sound policies and the EAP would provide a safeguard by 
enabling the Fund to carefully scrutinize access request and compliance with eligibility 
criteria (IMF 2009a: 33).  More generally, the recent lending reforms are said to embed a 
number of safeguards to contain creditor moral hazard, notably by tailoring instruments 
to countries’ fundamentals and policy track records (IMF 2010d: 14). 
 
   
V.3    Involving the private sector in crisis resolution 
 
Many of these problems associated with IMF lending at times of large and 
persistent capital outflows were recognized during the recurrent crises in emerging 
economies in the 1990s and early 2000s, and a wide agreement emerged for involving the 
private sector in crisis resolution – that is, continued or increased exposure of 
international creditors to a debtor country facing serious difficulties in meeting its 
external financial obligations as well as arrangements that alter the terms and conditions 
of such exposure, including maturity rollovers and debt write offs.  A proposal pioneered 
by UNCTAD was to draw on certain principles of national bankruptcy laws, notably 
those of the US insolvency code, for preventing liquidity problems from erupting into 
full-blown financial and economic crises and bringing an orderly resolution to sovereign 
debt when default is inevitable.
26   
 
Briefly, the application of these principles to international debt would involve, 
first, temporary standstills on payment of both sovereign and private external debt.  The 
standstill decision needs to be sanctioned by an international authority to provide 
automatic stay on creditor litigation.  This should be accompanied by exchange controls 
in order to stop the money fleeing the country in other ways.   Standstills and restrictions 
need to be introduced to stop large and persistent outflows irrespective of whether 
payments difficulties reflect liquidity gaps or solvency problems that could eventually 
lead to default – something that is not always easy to identify ex ante. 
  
Second, there could still be a need for the provision of external financing to the 
country imposing debt standstill and exchange restrictions.  This could be secured by 
means of the so-called debtor-in-possession financing which automatically grants 
seniority status to new debt contracted after the imposition of the standstill.  The task 
should primarily be assumed by the IMF by lending into arrears to private creditors.  This 
would give de jure preferred creditor status to the IMF for its crisis lending.  While it has 
to be recognized that money is fungible and in practice it is not always possible to 
identify the need catered for by a particular loan, it is important to ensure that IMF 
                                                 
26 UNCTAD was the first international organisation calling for orderly workout procedures during the debt 
crisis in the 1980s, drawing on chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code, noting that the absence of a clear and 
impartial framework for resolving international debt problems trapped many developing countries in 
situations where they suffered the stigma of being judged de facto bankrupt without the protection and 
relief which come from de jure insolvency (UNCTAD TDR 1986: annex to chapter IV).  The proposal was 
revisited after the East Asian crisis (UNCTAD TDR 1998).  For the application of Chapter 9 of the US 
insolvency law dealing with debt of public agencies, see Raffer (1990).  For the debate around mandatory 
debt-workout mechanisms, see Akyüz (2002 and 2005) and Keiser (2010). Why The IMF And The International Monetary System Need More Than Cosmetic Reform 
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lending to counter volatility in private capital flows should aim primarily at maintaining 
imports and the level of economic activity rather than guaranteeing debt repayment to 
private creditors and maintaining capital account convertibility.  This implies that there 
should be strict limits to IMF lending during capital account crises.  
  
The third stage would be debt restructuring.  In liquidity crises, standstills may 
need to be accompanied by extension of maturities of existing obligations and in most 
cases this can be negotiated between the debtor and creditors.  The introduction of 
automatic rollover and collective action clauses (CACs) in debt contracts would facilitate 
voluntary settlements.  However, in the case of insolvency when debt can no longer be 
paid according to original terms and conditions and default is inevitable, there would be 
need for impartial arbitration.   
 
It is true that standstills and exchange restrictions could create difficulties for 
international lenders and investors which are often located in AEs, particularly when the 
amounts involved are large.  Such systemic problems should be dealt with by national 
lenders-of-last-resort by providing support directly to their banks and other creditors in 
distress, rather than by IMF lending to debtor countries to keep them current on their debt 
payments.  Many of the incentives proposed by the IMF (2009a: 17) to secure voluntary 
involvement of private creditors in crisis resolution, including forbearance by creditor 
country regulators for capital inadequacy and injection of capital into troubled lenders 
could be used to mitigate the impact of standstills and exchange controls on creditors in 
AEs.    
  
During the earlier bouts of instability and crises in emerging economies the IMF 
(1999 and 2000b) recognized the need for “involving the private sector in forestalling and 
resolving financial crises”, but insisted on voluntary mechanisms.  However, as these 
proved ineffective and some AEs started to oppose bailouts, the IMF Board agreed that 
“in extreme circumstances, if it is not possible to reach agreement on a voluntary 
standstill, members may find it necessary, as a last resort, to impose one unilaterally”, 
and that since “there could be a risk that this action would trigger capital outflows … a 
member would need to consider whether it might be necessary to resort to the 
introduction of more comprehensive exchange or capital controls” (IMF 2000a).  The 
Board was also willing to give support by “signalling the Fund’s acceptance of a 
standstill imposed by a member … through a decision … to lend into arrears to private 
creditors.”  The Fund secretariat went even further and proposed a formal sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism (SDRM) to “allow a country to come to the Fund and request a 
temporary standstill on the repayment of its debts, during which time it would negotiate a 
rescheduling with its creditors, given the Fund’s consent to that line of attack” and to 
impose exchange controls (Krueger 2001: 7). 
 
  However, the SDRM proposal did not fundamentally address the problems 
associated with IMF bailouts.  It was designed for countries facing insolvency while 
those experiencing liquidity problems were to continue to rely on IMF lending.  The 
provision for statutory protection to debtors in the form of a stay on litigation was 
subsequently dropped.  Even the diluted version of the proposal could not elicit adequate Research Papers  36 
political support and had to be withdrawn, and the attention has shifted to contractual and 
voluntary mechanisms, notably CACs in sovereign bond contracts.
27 
 
While expanding its lending instruments and capacity, the Fund is once again 
opposing mandatory mechanisms to involve the private sector in crisis resolution and 
advocating, instead, voluntary mechanisms.  Given the limited scope for voluntary 
involvement of private creditors in crisis resolution and the rapidly growing scale of 
bailout operations, this could not only overstretch the Fund’s resources, but also endanger 
its financial integrity.  This should be a matter of concern for a number of emerging 
economies which are now becoming creditors to the IMF.  
 
Voluntary and mandatory mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.  There can be 
little doubt that countries would use mandatory mechanisms with considerable discretion 
and only as a last resort, preferring, instead, voluntary agreements with private creditors.  
And the Fund should lend to ensure that temporary liquidity gaps do not develop into 
full-blown crises.  However, it should not finance large and persistent outflows of capital 
and should insist on private sector involvement in one way or another for continuing to 
provide support during a capital account crisis.  
 
Sovereign debt workout mechanisms are on the agenda in the EU because of 
growing concern for insolvency of some member states and increased public discontent 
with bailout operations.  In July 2010 the German finance minister proposed to equip the 
EU with a sovereign insolvency framework for orderly restructuring of unsustainable 
public debt in member countries and shifting at least part of the burden to private 
creditors.  There are also suggestions for the creation of a European Monetary Fund 
“capable of managing an orderly default and debt restructuring of a government within 
the EMU” and making “the no bail-out provision of the Maastricht Treaty credible again 
(Gros and Mayer 2010: 2).  Whether these will produce effective arrangements needed to 
deal with the kind of difficulties associated with bailouts remains to be seen.  However, 
they certainly reflect a recognition that current modalities of intervention in capital 
account crises call for a fundamental rethinking.  
                                                 




VI   C ONCLUSIONS 
 
  The current turmoil in the world economy has demonstrated once again that the 
international arrangements lack mechanisms to prevent financial crises with global 
repercussions.  Not only are effective rules and regulations absent to bring inherently 
unstable international financial market and capital flows under control, but there is no 
multilateral discipline over misguided monetary, financial and exchange rate policies in 
systemically important countries despite their disproportionately large adverse 
international spillovers.  Both national and international policy makers are preoccupied 
with resolving crises by opening the faucets and spigots to support those who are at the 
origin of the problems, rather than introducing institutional arrangements to reduce the 
likelihood of their recurrence.  Through such interventions, they are creating more 
problems than they are solving, and indeed sowing the seeds for future difficulties.  For 
the first time in the post-war era, widespread economic difficulties are seriously 
threatening to disrupt whatever order the international economic system may have, by 
giving rise to beggar-my-neighbour policies in major economies, largely because of 
absence of multilateral disciplines over exchange rate policies and orderly and equitable 
adjustment to global trade imbalances without scarifying growth.  
 
The international monetary and financial arrangements need a major overhaul.  
The primary objective should be to deliver “the global public good of financial stability.”  
The missing components should now be evident after persistent instability and recurrent 
crises in emerging and mature economies: 
 
•  There is need to establish credible and effective surveillance over national 
monetary and financial policies with global repercussions.  This very much 
depends on introducing enforceable commitments and obligations regarding 
exchange rates of major currencies and adjustment to imbalances by both deficit 
and surplus countries.   
 
•  The world economy should move away from the current reserves system centred 
on the US dollar.  This is essential not only for reducing global trade imbalances 
and securing greater international monetary stability, but also for the scarce 
resources of poorer countries to be used for investment and growth, rather than 
being transferred to the reserve issuer enjoying the exorbitant privilege of being 
able to live beyond its means without encountering serious costs.   
 
•  There should be a serious rethinking of the approach to international capital 
flows.  The international community should firmly establish that controls over 
capital flows are legitimate tools of policy and they should be used not only by 
DEEs but also AEs to secure macroeconomic and financial stability.   
 
•  Crisis intervention and lending should not undermine market discipline and distort 
the balance between debtors and creditors.  Private creditors and investors should Research Papers  38 
be involved in the resolution of payments crises through both voluntary and 
mandatory mechanisms.  With mounting sovereign debt with international 
dimensions in several emerging and mature economies, it is no longer possible to 
deny or ignore the need for impartial sovereign insolvency procedures.     
 
Although some specific proposals are discussed above to address these problems, 
the objective of this paper is not to provide blueprints, but to draw attention to main 
shortcomings in international monetary and financial arrangements.  Genuine reform in 
these areas no doubt requires considerable reflection and debate in the international 
community in search of viable and effective solutions.  This presupposes recognition of 
problems and shortcomings in the first place.  However, the agendas of the G20 and the 
IMF still miss some of the most important issues that need urgent attention. 
 
Developing countries have a particular stake in this endeavour given their 
vulnerability to adverse spillovers from AEs and limited capacity to respond.  If major 
countries do not support the establishment of an orderly and equitable international 
monetary and financial system, DEEs should find ways and means of protecting 
themselves and looking after their interests through regional cooperation.  These include 
arrangements regarding regional currencies and exchange rate mechanisms, intra-regional 
provision of international liquidity, policy surveillance and regulation of financial 
markets and capital flows.  There can be little doubt that in many of these areas regional 
arrangements are generally inferior to those that could be established at the global level.  
But they definitely are better than a “non-system” pulled and pushed around by major 
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